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Abstract
The aim of the present study was to examine the neural signatures of gaining money for self and charity. Young adults (N = 31,
21–24 years of age) underwent fMRI scanning while they performed a task in which they could earn money for themselves and
for a self-chosen charity by selecting one of two options with unknown outcomes. The results showed elevated activity in the
ventral striatumwhen gaining for the self only and for self and charity, but not when gaining for charity only. However, increased
ventral striatal activity when gaining for charity only was correlated with participants’ self-reported empathic concern and
enjoyment when winning for charity. Empathic concern was also related to donating a larger proportion of earnings to charity
after the MRI session. In short, these results reveal robust ventral striatal activity when gaining for oneself, but empathy-
dependent individual differences in ventral striatal activity when gaining for charity.
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Prosocial behavior is an important social glue within society,
leading, for example, to charity donations and helping behavior
toward unknown others (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006).
In addition to its benefits for others, prosocial behavior affects
the donator as well. For instance, there is a strong relationship
between prosocial behavior and happiness, which is universal
across countries and cultures (Aknin et al., 2013), suggesting
that acting prosocially feels good. Indeed, researchers who have
examined the neural components of prosociality have theorized
that this hedonic aspect, Bthe warm glow of giving,^might be a
possible motivator to perform prosocial behavior (Andreoni,
1990; Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; Moll et al., 2006).
In the present study, we aimed to test the processes related to
this hedonistic aspect of prosociality.
One way to gain more insight into the rewarding feeling of
being prosocial is through studying responses when gaining re-
wards for others (often referred to as vicarious gaining), and
through comparing these responses to those observed when
gaining rewards for oneself. Gaining for oneself has consistently
been associated with activity in the ventral striatum (Báez-
Mendoza & Schultz, 2013; Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015;
Delgado, 2007; Montague & Berns, 2002; Schultz, 2016;
Sescousse, Caldú, Segura, & Dreher, 2013), but there is some
controversy regarding this rewarding effect of vicarious gains.
That is, several studies have shown that vicarious gaining was
associated with activation in the ventral striatum (Mobbs et al.,
2009; Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman, & Galvan, 2013), such as
when gaining rewards for friends (Braams, Güroǧlu, et al.,
2014a; Varnum, Shi, Chen, Qiu, & Han, 2014), close others
(Inagaki et al., 2016), or charities (Harbaugh et al., 2007; Moll
et al., 2006). However, this rewarding effect has not been found
in all studies (Morelli, Sacchet, & Zaki, 2015). That is, ventral
striatal activity during vicarious gaining is likely dependent on
individual differences in how important the other is to you
(Braams, Peters, Peper, Güroǧlu, & Crone, 2014; Telzer et al.,
2013), in willingness to give to others (Kuss et al., 2013), in
relationship closeness (Fareri, Niznikiewicz, Lee, & Delgado,
2012), and in traits such as empathic concern (Andreoni, Rao,
& Trachtman, 2017), although no prior study has tested this
experimentally. One study on vicarious reward prediction has
shown that trait empathy was correlated with anterior cingulate
cortex activation when predicting vicarious rewards, but not
when predicting personal rewards, which supports the hypothesis
that trait empathy could be related to aspects of vicarious-reward
processing (Lockwood, Apps, Roiser, & Viding, 2015).
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Besides the role that the ventral striatum might play in the
valuation of personal and vicarious rewards, activity in the VS
during personal and vicarious gains might play an integral role
in social reward learning (Lockwood, Apps, Valton, Viding, &
Roiser, 2016). For instance, Lockwood et al. (2016) used a
probabilistic learning task in which participants could earn
rewards for themselves and others, and showed that striatal
activity during the task was related to prediction errors for
rewards, regardless of the beneficiary. Thus, these findings
suggest that the ventral striatum might serve a more general
role in learning (e.g., irrespective of target).
In addition to the literature on the neural correlates of
obtaining personal rewards and vicarious rewards in a vacuum
(e.g., in separate conditions), some studies have focused on
shared rewards instead. For instance, it was previously found that
individuals show stronger ventral striatum activity when both
parties cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma (Krill & Platek,
2012; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004), sug-
gesting that shared outcomes are more rewarding than gaining at
the expense of others (Güroglu, van den Bos, & Crone, 2014;
Rilling et al., 2002). Higher ventral striatum activity has also been
found when reciprocating the trust of unknown others, but only
when engaging inmultiple interactions with the same individuals
(Bellucci, Chernyak, Goodyear, Eickhoff, &Krueger, 2017), and
for individuals who hadmore prosocial tendencies (Van denBos,
Van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009). In addition,
gaining for self at the expense of others’ outcomes was related to
more activity in anterior medial prefrontal cortex and anterior
cingulate cortex (Feng, Luo, & Krueger, 2015; Van den Bos
et al., 2009). The medial prefrontal cortex has previously been
associated with a myriad of cognitive processes, amongst which
are self-reflection (D’Argembeau, 2013; Feng et al., 2015;
Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011), formation of self-oriented motives
(Van Overwalle, 2009), and memory and decision making
(Euston, Gruber, & McNaughton, 2012). In social neuroscience,
the anterior cingulate cortex has been related, amongst other
processes, to social learning and empathy (Behrens, Hunt,
Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Lockwood, 2016; Lockwood
et al., 2016), which might explain why studies have associated
this region with gaining at the expense of others.
When gaining shared rewards (e.g., rewards for both one-
self and charity), we hypothesized that at least two processes
would be important: the (anticipated) rewarding feeling of
giving to others (probably related to ventral striatum activity)
and evaluating the consequences for the self (possibly related
to medial prefrontal cortex [mPFC] activity). Prior studies on
prosocial giving have not yet distinguished between these two
processes when examining giving to charity.
Thus, overall there is some inconsistency in the literature
regarding the role of the ventral striatum in vicarious gaining.
Although rewards for the self consistently engage regions in
the ventral striatum (Báez-Mendoza & Schultz, 2013;
Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015; Delgado, 2007; Montague &
Berns, 2002; Schultz, 2016; Sescousse et al., 2013), studies
that have examined vicarious rewards have shown less con-
sistent results. Thus, it is important to investigate more thor-
oughly the underlying processes that might determine whether
or not vicarious gaining, an important component of prosocial
giving (Morelli et al., 2015; Telzer, 2016), is associated with
ventral striatum activity. To address this issue in the present
study, we aimed to further unravel which processes are impor-
tant for ventral striatum activation in vicarious gaining.
Therefore, we used a new functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) paradigm in which we could keep the interper-
sonal factors that influence vicarious gaining relatively stable.
That is, we focused on vicarious gaining for a charity, which is
a relatively stable distal Bother.^ Participants chose a charity
from a list of ten big charities (see Kuss et al., 2013, for a
similar approach), and subsequently performed a task in the
MRI scanner in which they could earn extra money for them-
selves and for the chosen charity by making a random, two-
option decision on each trial. The different conditions for
these outcomes were presented in a format such that several
combinations of gains were possible: gains just for the self,
gains just for charity, shared gains for both charity and the self,
and no gains for either party. The size of the outcomes was
varied, both to keep participants engaged in the task and to
distinguish between absolute and relative amounts of gain
(Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). In this way, vicarious
gains for charity could be contrasted with gaining only for
oneself and gaining for both parties, the latter of which had
not been studied before. We focused on the roles of the ventral
striatum and the medial PFC on the basis of prior studies that
have suggested that both have an important role in prosocial
behavior and self-related motivations (Bellucci et al., 2017;
Feng et al., 2015). Since the exact contributions of these re-
gions are not well understood in the context of prosociality, we
examined the relation between neural responses to vicarious
gains for charity, self-reported enjoyment of gaining for char-
ity, and subsequent donating behavior to charity (Kuss et al.,
2013). In addition, we examined the role of individual differ-
ences in empathic concern and in self-reported enjoyment for
charity gains, to investigate whether the magnitude of activa-
tion in ventral striatum activity is dependent on individual
differences in these domains.
We expected ventral striatum activation to be higher when
gaining for the self than when there was no gain, consistent
with prior studies showing a role of the ventral striatum in
reward processing (Haber & Knutson, 2010; Morelli et al.,
2015; Schultz, 2016). In combination with research that sug-
gests that prosocial behavior may feel rewarding (Dunn,
Aknin, & Norton, 2014; Telzer, 2016), we expected gain sit-
uations in which both the self and charity benefited to result in
more ventral striatum activation than situations in which only
the self gained (Krill & Platek, 2012), and that charity gains
would result in higher activity in the ventral striatum than
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would no gain (Kuss et al., 2013). In addition to expectations
about the effects of different outcomes, we hypothesized that
individual differences in empathic concern, which have been
shown to relate to ventral striatum activity (Morelli, Rameson,
& Lieberman, 2014), and differences in the perceived impor-
tance of the charity, which have been shown to affect the
pleasure of giving (Aknin et al., 2013), would both be related
to variations in the neural reactions to gaining for charity.
Finally, we predicted that participants who showed higher
vicarious responses in the ventral striatum when gaining for
charity would also donate more to charity (Kuss et al., 2013).
Method
Participants and procedure
Thirty-one participants between the ages of 21 and 24 partici-
pated in this study (16 males, 15 females;M = 22.54 years, SD
= 1.19). The participants were recruited from a participant da-
tabase. The ethics commission board of the Leiden University
Medical Center (LUMC) approved the study and its proce-
dures. Written informed consent was obtained from all partici-
pants, whowere also right-handed and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Participants were screened with question-
naires on three separate occasions (once by phone call, once
by email, and once on the testing day) for MRI contra-
indications and for (history of) neurological and/or psychiatric
disorders. All anatomical MRI scans were reviewed by a radi-
ologist. No anomalous findings were reported.
Materials
COSY fMRI task To investigate responses to vicarious gains for
charity, we developed a new fMRI task called the COSY
(Bcharity or self yield^). In the COSY task, participants could
earn money for themselves and for a previously self-chosen
charity by deciding which of two curtains to open on every trial.
After participants pressed a button, an onscreen hand indicated
what option they had selected. Next, the chosen curtain opened
in a fluid animation (14 frames presented for 50 ms each), with
the outcomes being fully visible from the seventh frame on-
ward. The overall outcome was a division of either €4 between
parties or €2 between parties. In the case of a division of €4
(high stakes), this could result in the following outcomes:
SelfHigh [€4 self, €0 charity], CharityHigh [€0 self, €4 charity],
or BothHigh [both €2]. In the case of a division of €2 (low
stakes), this could result in the following outcomes: SelfLow
[€2 self, €0 charity], CharityLow [€0 self, €2 charity], or
BothLow [both €1]. In both conditions, these outcomes were
contrasted against a zero-gain baseline, BothNoGain [both €0].
The two stakes were used both to keep participants engaged in
the task and to control for magnitude when examining the
effects of mutual gain (Tabibnia et al., 2008). A black jitter
screen (0–8,800 ms) was presented after the outcome presenta-
tion, marking the end of a trial (see Fig. 1 for a graphical
representation of the trial flow and the outcome conditions).
Before participants played the COSY task in the scanner,
they were given instructions for the fMRI task on a laptop.
They were instructed which buttons to press during the fMRI
task and played five randomly selected mock trials to get some
experience with the short (2,000-ms) timeframe in which to
make a response. Participants were not given any information
about whether or not there were differences between the cur-
tains or about the outcome distribution. Unknown to the par-
ticipant, every outcome condition occurred 15 times during
the task. This resulted in a total of 105 trials. The outcomes
in the task were presented randomly to the participant, though
the order of trials was optimized for our design using the
program Optseq2 (Dale, 1999). The task consisted of two
blocks, of 50 and 55 trials, respectively. Each block lasted
approximately 6 min. At the end of the research day, partici-
pants received extra money based on the average of three
random outcomes (ranging from €1 to €3 for both self and
charity) and were informed of this beforehand.
Questionnaires
COSY manipulation checks After the fMRI session, partici-
pants answered several questions about the COSY task.
First, to obtain a subjective measure of the enjoyment when
gaining for charity, we asked how the different outcome con-
ditions felt, to be answered on a scale from 1 = did not feel
good at all and 7 = felt very good. Second, we asked whether
participants thought they could influence the outcome and
why they thought this was or was not the case. Finally, we
asked participants how important they rated the charity, how
well they knew what the charity stood for, and whether or not
they normally donated to this charity in daily life. All ques-
tions were answered on 7-point Likert scales.
Empathy and perspective taking To investigate individual
differences in empathy and perspective taking, we used the
Empathy and Perspective-Taking subscales of the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) questionnaire (Davis,
1980; Hawk et al., 2013). Both subscales were reliable, with
Cronbach’s alpha values, respectively, of .72 and .79.
Behavioral donating task In the exit interview after the fMRI
session, participants played a one-shot Dictator Game for
themselves and charity. Specifically, participants were given
the choice to distribute 600 valuable coins (that were worth
extra participant money) between themselves and the charity
of their choice, by selecting one of seven possible divisions on
a scale (1 = 600 for self, 0 for charity; 2 = 500 for self, 100 for
charity; 3 = 400 for self, 200 for charity; 4 = 300 for self, 300
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for charity; 5 = 200 for self, 400 for charity; 6 = 100 for self,
500 for charity; and 7 = 0 for self, 600 for charity). To prevent
socially desirable behavior, it was stressed that the distribution
chosen would remain completely anonymous. To ensure full
anonymity, neither the participant nor the experimenter could
see the outcomes of the donation task on the research day.
MRI data acquisition MRI data were acquired using a Philips
3.0-T scanner with a standard whole-head coil attached. For
the functional MRI scans, we used T2*-weighted echo-planar
imaging (TR = 2.2 s, TE = 30 ms, FOV: 220 mm, 80 × 80
matrix, 2.75 mm in-plane resolution). The functional scans
consisted of two runs with 175 and 169 volumes, respectively.
Participants were able to see the screen through a mirror that
was attached to the head coil. The functional task lasted for
about 13 min in total. In addition to the fMRI sequences, we
collected structural images for anatomical reference (high-res-
olution 3-D T1), TR = 9.751 ms, TE = 4.59 ms, FOV = 224 ×
168 × 177 mm. Participants’ head movements were restricted
by using foam triangles to limit the available space in the coil.
MRI data analyses
PreprocessingWeused the software package SPM8 (Wellcome
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London) to preprocess and
analyze all MRI data. For preprocessing, we first corrected all
MRI images for motion and slice timing acquisition, and con-
sequently spatially normalized the functional scans to T1 tem-
plates. Then, all volumes were resampled to voxels of 3×3×3
millimeters.We based our templates on theMNI305 stereotaxic
space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, & Evans, 1997). Finally, we
used an isotropic Gaussian kernel (6-mm full width at half
maximum) to spatially smooth the data.
fMRI analysis To calculate the relevant contrasts, we modeled
the fMRI time series convolved with the hemodynamic re-
sponse function with events that corresponded to both the
decision and outcome phases of a trial. For the outcome phase
specifically, the events of interest that we modeled were the
outcome conditions BSelfHigh,^ BSelfLow,^ BCharityHigh,^
BCh a r i t y L ow, ^ BBo t hH i g h , ^ BBo t h L ow, ^ a n d
Fig. 1 This figure shows the basic trial flow of the COSY task. Each trial
started with a black screen with a jittered duration between 0 and 8,800
ms. Subsequently, a fixation cross was shown for 500ms, followed by the
response selection screen for 2,000 ms. After a response was made, a
hand was shown onscreen for the remainder of the 2,000 ms. If a
response was made, the next 14 screens showed a fluid animation of a
hand pulling the curtain open, revealing the outcome (shown here = self
€2, charity €2). The feedback remained onscreen for 2,300 ms. If
participants failed to respond within the timeframe of response
selection, a screen with the phrase BToo Late!^ was instead shown for
3,000ms. The possible outcomes are displayed in the table below the trial
flow
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BBothNoGain.^ These events were time-locked, with zero du-
ration, to the exact moment that participants were able to see
the outcome: the seventh frame of the curtain-opening anima-
tion. Trials with no response from the participants were coded
as BMissing^ and modeled separately as invalid trials, and
they were not included in further contrasts. For the seven
outcome conditions mentioned above, we also modeled the
respective decision phases, with variable durations corre-
sponding to participants’ reaction times. All modeled events
were added as regressors in a general linear model, along with
motion regressors, a basic set of cosine functions that high-
pass filtered the data, and a covariate for session effects. The
least squares parameter estimates of height of the best-fitting
canonical hemodynamic response function for each condition
were used in pairwise contrasts. The resulting contrast images,
computed on a subject-by-subject basis, were submitted to
random-effect group analyses. To test the hypotheses of this
study, we tested three contrasts using second-level whole-
brain group comparisons: self-gain versus both-gain, self-gain
versus charity-gain, and both-gain versus charity-gain. No
specific contrasts were made for magnitude of gain.
fMRI region-of-interest analysis To further investigate the neu-
ral effects of vicarious gaining for charity in relation to mag-
nitude of gain, we performed region-of-interest (ROI) analy-
ses using the Marsbar toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, &
Poline, 2002). We performed our analyses on a predefined
anatomical ROI (Braams, van Duijvenvoorde, Peper, &
Crone, 2015) of the left and right nucleus accumbens
(nAcc), a part of the ventral striatum, which was extracted
from the Harvard–Oxford subcortical atlas and thresholded
at 40%. The mask consisted of 28 voxels for the left nAcc
(coordinates left: x = – 9.57, y = 11.70, z = – 7.10) and 26
voxels for the right nAcc (coordinates right: x = 9.45, y =
12.60, z = – 6.69). We extracted parameter estimates for the
ROI analyses. Given that none of the results showed differ-
ences between hemispheres, all the analyses were performed
by collapsing across the left and right hemispheres.
Results
Behavioral results
COSY manipulation checks Participants rated on a scale from 1
to 7 how much they had enjoyed winning different magnitudes
of money (€1, €2, and €4) for themselves and charity. A 3
(magnitude) × 2 (beneficiary: self or charity) analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) resulted in a main effect of magnitude [F(2, 60)
= 37.77, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62]. Follow-up analyses confirmed that
€4 magnitudes were rated as more enjoyable than €2 magni-
tudes [F(1, 30) = 23.03, p < .001, g = .65], and €2 magnitudes
were rated higher than €1 magnitudes [F(1, 30) = 34.01, p <
.001, g = .61]. There was no main effect or interaction with
charity, suggesting that winning for oneself (€1, M = 4.71; €2,
M = 5.42; and €4,M = 6.13) and winning for charity (€1,M =
5.26; €2, M = 5.68; and €4, M = 6.00) were rated as equally
pleasurable. As can be seen in Table 1, self-reported enjoyment
when winning for oneself and self-reported enjoyment when
winning for charity were not correlated.
All possible charities were chosen at least once by the par-
ticipants. The perceived importance of the chosen charity was
relatively high for all participants (M = 5.58, SD = .91).
Knowledge of the charity was more variable (M = 4.56, SD
= 1.30). There were no correlations between the perceived
importance of the charity and knowledge about the activities
of the charity (all ps > .12).
Participants were asked whether they thought they could in-
fluence the outcome of the task (multiple choice: no/sometimes/
yes). One of the participants answered Byes^ to this question, 22
answered Bno,^ and eight answered Bsometimes.^We reanalyzed
the data while excluding the nine participants who provided the
Byes^ and Bsometimes^ answers, but this did not change the
results. Therefore, we report the data from all participants.
Finally, to explore the impact of the various included indi-
vidual differencemeasures on enjoyment for self-gains, charity-
gains, and both-gains, we conducted regression analyses with
enjoyment for the three beneficiaries (self-enjoyment, charity-
enjoyment, and both-enjoyment) as respective dependent vari-
ables, and empathic concern, perspective taking, importance of
charity, knowledge of charity, daily-life donating, and donation
behavior as independent variables in separate analyses. First,
for the regression analyses, none of the independent variables
were significant predictors of self-enjoyment (all ps > .34).
Second, for the regression analysis on charity enjoyment, em-
pathic concern (β = .43, p = .014), importance of the charity (β
= .42, p = .017), and daily-life donating (β = .43, p = .015) were
significant positive predictors of charity enjoyment. Perspective
taking and knowledge about the charity were not significant
(both ps > .06). Third, with respect to the regression for both-
enjoyment, none of the individual predictors were significant
(all ps > .12) (see also Table 1).
Behavioral donating task Participants donated on average 280
of the 600 coins to charity (SD = 164.8) in the one-shot dona-
tion Dictator Game. Donating behavior was normally distrib-
uted, with a skewness of .36 (SE = .42) and a kurtosis of .19
(SE = .82). Donating behavior was positively correlated to the
IRI-EC subscale [r(31) = .54, p < .001], negatively correlated
to how much participants enjoyed gaining for the self [r(31) =
– .41, p = .021], and positively correlated to the self-reported
ratings of the subjective importance of the charity [r(31) = .61,
p < .001]. No other significant correlations were found with
self-reported daily-life donation behavior.
To explore the impact of the individual difference measures
on donation behavior, we conducted a regression analysis with
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2019) 19:845–858 849
donation behavior as the dependent variable and empathic con-
cern, perspective taking, importance of the charity, knowledge of
the charity, daily-life donating, and donation behavior as inde-
pendent variables. Of the independent variables, empathic con-
cern, importance of the charity, and daily-life donating were sig-
nificant positive predictors. That is, the higher were empathic
concern (β = .54, p = .002), charity importance (β = .61, p >
.001), and daily-life donating (β = .43, p = .015), the more par-
ticipants donated to charity in the one-shot donation Dictator
Game. In addition, self-enjoyment negatively predicted donation
behavior, with higher self-enjoyment (β = – .41, p = .021) being
related to less donations (see also Table 1).
Empathy and perspective taking Scores on the IRI Empathic
Concern (IRI-EC) subscale ranged from 1.67 to 4.33, with M =
3.23 (SD = .63), and scores were approximately normally distrib-
uted,with skewness and kurtosis values between – 2 and 2 (Field,
2009;Gravetter&Wallnau,2014);skewness=– .33(SE=.42)and
kurtosis = .22 (SE = .82). Scores on the Perspective Taking sub-
scale (IRI-PT) ranged from2.33 to5,withM=3.85 (SD=0.63), a
skewness of – .12 (SE = .42), and a kurtosis of – .06 (SE = .82).
Neural activity
The results of the fMRI analyses are presented in two sections.
First, we computed whole-brain contrasts for the three condi-
tions by collapsing across magnitudes, and second, we tested
the effects of condition and magnitude using ROI analyses of
the nAcc (a region in the ventral striatum).
Whole-brain analyses Since we expected that gaining for one-
self would lead to more activation than vicarious gaining for
charity, we first tested the contrast Self-gain > Charity-gain
and the reversed contrast at the whole-brain level. Self-gain >
Charity-gain resulted in bilateral activation in the ventral stri-
atum (see Fig. 2 and Table 2). The reversed contrast (Charity-
gain > Self-gain) did not result in significant activation.
To investigate the unique contribution of gains for oneself, as
compared to gains for both oneself and charity, we tested the
contrast Self-gain > Both-gain and the reversed contrast Both-
gain > Self-gain. This resulted in increased activation in a set of
brain regions including regions in the supplementary motor cor-
tex (SMA), medial prefrontal cortex (right/medial frontal superi-
or gyrus) extending into the anterior cingulate cortex (cingulum),
and bilateral insula (see Table 2 for a full list of the activations).
The reversed contrast only resulted in one cluster of activation in
the posterior parietal cortex (see Table 2).
In the final contrast, to explore the unique contribution of
charity gains as compared to gains for both charity and one-
self, we tested Charity-gain > Both-gain and the reversed con-
trast. The contrast Charity-gain > Both-gain did not result in
any activation clusters. The reversed contrast again resulted in
bilateral activation in the ventral striatum (see Table 2).
ROI analyses Next, we performed ROI analyses to examine
our a priori hypotheses concerning the ventral striatum in
more detail. In cases in which the assumption of sphericity
was violated, we report Greenhouse–Geisser corrections.
To disentangle the effects of beneficiary and outcome size, we
conducted a repeated measures ANOVAwith beneficiary (three
levels: self, charity, both) and outcome size (two levels: high and
low) as within-subjects factors. All parameter estimates in the
repeatedmeasuresANOVAwere based on the different condition
estimates minus the parameter estimate for the baseline condition
(BothNoGain) (results are shown in Fig. 3).
The results yielded a main effect of beneficiary [F(1.58,
47.53) = 8.15, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21]. The main effect of outcome
size and the interaction between beneficiary and outcome size
were not significant [F(1, 30) = 2.44, p = .13, ηp
2 = .07, and
F(1.87, 56.21) = 0.91, p = .41, ηp
2 = .029, respectively]. Post-hoc
pairwise comparisons showed that the main effect of beneficiary
was driven by significant differences between self-gain and both-
gain versus charity-gain. More specifically, higher activity in the
ventral striatum was found for self-gain (M = .73) than for
Table 1 Correlations between IRI scores; COSYoutcome enjoyment ratings for self, charity, and both; importance; knowledge; daily-life donating;
and donation behavior
IRI_PT Self Gain Char. Gain Both Gain Importance Knowledge Daily-Life Donating Donation Behavior
IRI_EC .47** – .13 .44* – .27 .38* .47** .24 .54**
IRI_PT – .18 .07 – .15 – .05 .38* .34 .13
Self gain .22 – .23 – .06 .18 .03 – .41*
Char. gain – .18 .42* .33 .43* .30
Both gain – .10 – .23 – .20 – .14
Importance .09 .21 .61**
Knowledge .35 – .05
Daily-life donating .08
* p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed
850 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2019) 19:845–858
charity-gain (M = – .22, p = .007), and also for both-gain (M =
.54) than for charity-gain (M = – .22, p < .001). The differences
between self-gain and both-gain were not significant.
Relations between ventral striatum activation
and individual differences
Enjoyment ratings Next we investigated whether ventral stri-
atum activation for self-gain, charity-gain, and both-gain were
related to individual differences in enjoyment ratings.
We correlated winning for charity (CharityHigh) relative to
baseline (BothNoGain) with self-reported enjoyment of win-
ning for charity. Higher enjoyment ratings for charity gains
(averaged across €1, €2, and €4) were significantly correlated
with higher ventral striatum activation for charity-gain [r(31)
= .377, p = .037]. These results are shown in Fig. 4.
We found a similar pattern when examining enjoyment
ratings when winning for oneself (averaged across €1, €2,
and €4). Here, higher enjoyment ratings for self gains were
significantly correlated with higher ventral striatum activation
for self-gain [r(31) = .45, p = .01].
Interestingly, activation when gaining for both oneself and
charity relative to baseline (BothHigh – BothNoGain) was pos-
itively correlated with enjoyment ratings of gaining for oneself
[r(31) = .36, p = .046], but was not significantly correlated with
enjoyment ratings of gaining for charity (p = .987).
Finally, to test whether the correlations between empathic
concern and enjoyment of gaining for oneself were higher
than the correlations between empathic concern and enjoy-
ment of gaining for charity, we used the R Bcocor^ package
(Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015). There were no significant
differences between the correlations (all ps > .67).
Empathic concern and perspective taking Next, we tested
whether ventral striatum activation for self-gain and for charity-
gain (both relative to the baseline BothNoGain) were correlated
with individual differences in empathic concern and perspective
taking. We found a significant correlation between empathic
concern and charity-gain [r(31) = .44, p = .014], but not between
empathic concern and self-gain (p> .4). See Fig. 5 for a graphical
representation of the relation between empathic concern and
charity-gain. We found no significant correlations between per-
spective taking and ventral striatum activation (all ps > .4).
Donating behavior and importance ratings To investigate
whether actual donating behavior was related to ventral stria-
tum activation for self and charity gains, we computed the
correlations between neural activity in the nAcc ROI for
self-gain and charity-gain and donating behavior. None of
these correlations were significant (both ps > .5). Next, we
computed the correlations between charity-gain conditions
(CharityHigh and CharityLow) and self-reported ratings of
the subjective importance of the charity. These correlation
were also not significant (both ps > .2)
Discussion
The goal of this study was to test neural responses in the
ventral striatum during the processing of vicarious rewards
Fig. 2 (A) Whole-brain results for the contrast Self-gain > Charity-gain,
and the regions of interest based on this contrast. (B) Whole-brain results
for the contrast Both-gain > Charity-gain, and the regions of interest
based on this contrast. (C) Whole-brain results for the contrast Self-gain
> Both-gain. All contrasts were family-wise error-corrected at p = .05
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Table 2 Coordinates for contrasts self-gain versus both-gain, self-gain versus charity-gain, and both-gain versus charity-gain, FDR cluster corrected
(initial threshold p < .001)
Contrast Region T K x y z
Self-gain > Right caudate 5.52 144 12 5 – 11
Charity-gain Right putamen 4.73 18 20 – 8
Right caudate 4.50 9 11 – 11
Right insula 4.37 27 26 – 5
Right insula 4.29 42 20 – 8
Right caudate 3.74 9 17 – 11
Left caudate 5.27 166 – 12 11 – 11
Right thalamus 5.01 3 – 4 4
Left caudate 4.78 – 9 11 – 2
Right thalamus 4.77 3 – 10 7
Left caudate 4.23 – 5 14 – 4
Self-gain > Supplementary motor area 5.02 96 9 14 61
Both-gain Right frontal superior gyrus 3.89 12 5 73
Right frontal superior gyrus 3.47 18 2 57
Left middle cingulum 4.89 105 – 9 29 34
Right middle cingulum 4.77 12 29 34
Right middle cingulum 4.28 15 23 31
Left frontal superior gyrus 4.02 – 24 41 37
Left frontal middle gyrus 3.93 – 27 47 37
Left frontal superior gyrus 3.88 – 21 38 34
Left insula 4.60 71 – 30 23 – 2
Left frontal inferior orbitofrontal gyrus 4.23 – 39 23 – 5
Left frontal inferior triangularis 3.55 – 48 17 1
Right insula 4.47 33 33 23 – 17
Frontal superior medial gyrus 4.35 66 – 6 50 25
Right frontal superior medial gyrus 3.97 3 53 22
Left frontal superior medial gyrus 3.91 – 15 41 22
Right frontal superior medial gyrus 3.50 9 56 34
Both-gain > Right middle temporal gyrus 4.2 90 42 – 52 – 2
Self-gain Right inferior temporal gyrus 4.71 45 – 46 – 11
Right inferior temporal gyrus 4.51 54 – 55 – 5
Both-gain > Right calcarine gyrus 6.54 276 12 – 91 7
Charity-gain Right primary visual area 6.29 15 – 76 7
Right lingual gyrus 5.03 24 – 57 4
Right precuneus 4.33 12 – 52 13
Cerebellar vermis 4.11 5 – 57 – 5
Right lingual gyrus 3.52 9 – 51 7
Right thalamus 5.43 247 3 – 10 4
Right caudate 5.10 9 17 – 8
Right olfactory gyrus 5.03 6 20 – 11
Right caudate 5.03 12 11 – 11
Right caudate 4.63 12 17 – 2
Right gyrus rectus 4.38 12 23 – 14
Left olfactory gyrus 4.33 – 3 23 – 5
Left caudate 4.12 – 9 14 – 11
Left olfactory gyrus 3.91 – 3 17 – 8
Left temporal superior gyrus 5.07 115 – 45 – 10 – 2
Left temporal superior gyrus 5.06 – 48 – 4 – 8
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for charity, when pitted against both self-gain andmutual gain.
Consistent with prior research (Braams et al., 2014a;
Harbaugh et al., 2007), there was robust activity in the ventral
striatum for self-gains, independent of whether gains were
obtained for oneself only, or for both self and charity.
However, no striatum activity was observed for vicarious
gains for charity. Interestingly, the neural responses to gains
for charity were dependent on individual differences in self-
Fig. 3 Whole-brain activity in the region of interest of bilateral nucleus
accumbens (nAcc) in the ventral striatum. Different bars reflect the
condition estimates minus the parameter estimate for the baseline
condition. Error bars display 95% confidence intervals of the standard
error of the mean. Asterisks reflect significance at p < .05
Table 2 (continued)
Contrast Region T K x y z
Left insula 4.68 – 39 – 13 – 5
Left precentral gyrus 4.31 – 51 – 1 22
Left temporal superior gyrus 4.21 – 57 – 7 7
Left temporal superior gyrus 4.16 – 54 – 7 – 2
Left postcentral gyrus 4.08 – 57 – 10 16
Left rolandic operculum 3.95 – 48 2 16
Left temporal superior gyrus 3.92 – 63 – 7 4
Left precentral gyrus 3.77 – 42 2 22
Left frontal inferior operculum 3.56 – 51 8 13
Right temporal superior gyrus 4.91 55 63 – 16 13
Right temporal superior gyrus 4.54 55 – 19 7
Left occipital superior gyrus 4.91 73 – 12 – 94 7
Left occipital middle gyrus 3.79 – 30 – 82 4
Left temporal middle gyrus 4.73 69 – 45 – 58 1
Left occipital middle gyrus 4.55 – 42 – 64 4
Left temporal middle gyrus 4.05 – 48 – 52 – 2
Left lingual gyrus 3.73 – 21 – 73 4
Left calcarine gyrus 4.48 46 – 6 – 73 16
Left precuneus 3.72 – 12 – 58 16
The Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas was used for labeling. For coordinates that were not defined in the AAL atlas, we reported the nearest
defined region
le
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reported enjoyment of gaining for charity and empathic
concern.
Gaining and the striatum
Studies have consistently shown that the ventral striatum is en-
gaged when gaining for oneself (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015;
Braams, Peters, et al., 2014b; Delgado, 2007; Montague &
Berns, 2002; Morelli et al., 2015; Schultz, 2016; Sescousse
et al., 2013). In this study, striatum activity for self-gains was
correlated with self-reported enjoyment of these gains, providing
further evidence that striatum activity may reflect the subjective
pleasure of receiving a reward (Báez-Mendoza & Schultz,
2013). We hypothesized that this subjective feeling of pleasure
might be larger when gaining for two parties (charity and self)
than when gaining only for oneself, but we did not find evidence
for this hypothesis in the present study. That is, the ventral stri-
atum was most strongly activated when gaining for the self only,
as compared to when gaining for charity only or when gaining
for both charity and oneself. Although ventral striatum activation
was observed in the both-gain condition, this activation was
possibly related to the reward gained for the self rather than to
the mutual beneficial outcome, which is supported by its signif-
icant correlation with self-reported enjoyment of self-gain but
not with charity-gain. Possibly, the rewarding effects related to
a mutual beneficial outcome are only observed in active tasks in
which participants work toward a goal together, such as in a
prisoner’s dilemma type tasks (Krill & Platek, 2012; Rilling
et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2016). Future studies should examine in
more detail the effect of relative gain for the self and for another,
and specifically should investigate under what circumstances
mutually beneficial outcomes are experienced as being more
rewarding than outcomes that are only beneficial for oneself.
The finding that less ventral striatum activation was present
for charity-gain than for both-gain or self-gain conditions was
contrary to our expectations. An earlier study examining vicar-
ious gains for charity (Harbaugh et al., 2007) had found evi-
dence for a Bwarm glow^ effect, although this discrepancy
could have been due to the smaller gains for charity in the
present study (max €4, as compared to a max of ~ €38 in
Harbaugh et al., 2007). However, several studies on vicarious-
reward processing using amounts of money comparable to our
paradigm have found that participants showed similar activity in
the ventral striatumwhen gaining for friends (Braams, Güroǧlu,
et al., 2014a) and mothers (Braams & Crone, 2017), as com-
pared to the self, and when gaining for in-group as compared to
out-group members (Hackel, Zaki, & Van Bavel, 2017).
Possibly this vicarious reward response varies as a function of
the strength of the personal connection to the target, which
would explain why striatum activity is consistently observed
for close others such as friends or family members, but not for
more distant others such as charities, regardless of the possible
need of the other party. This could be one possible explanation
for why it can be difficult to engage people in society to perform
prosocial behaviors such as giving to charity, and it should be
more thoroughly investigated in future research.
Interestingly, even though self-gains led to more striatum
activity than did charity gains (as compared to baseline), par-
ticipants rated winning for self and for charity as being equally
enjoyable. Perhaps these self-reported estimates of enjoyment
obtained through questionnaires might have been influenced
by social desirability, explaining the disjunction between neu-
ral measures of reward and self-report of reward.
Although there was no general striatum effect of gaining for
charity, there were important individual differences. First, indi-
viduals who reported enjoying gaining for charity more also
showed more ventral striatum activity for charity gains.
Similarly, individuals with higher self-reported empathic con-
cern also showedmore ventral striatum activity for charity gains
and donated more to charity afterward. Both results are consis-
tent with studies showing that the rewarding feeling of giving to
Fig. 5 The x-axis shows scores on the IRI Empathic Concern subscale.
The y-axis shows neural activation in bilateral nucleus accumbens (nAcc,
a region in the ventral striatum) in the CharityHigh > BothNoGain
contrast
Fig. 4 The x-axis shows the average of self-reported enjoyment for the
charity gaining €1, €2, and €4. The y-axis shows neural activation in the
ventral striatum, including the nucleus accumbens, in the CharityHigh >
BothNoGain contrast
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close others can be dependent on individual differences, such as
in the perceived importance of the other and in relationship
strength (Braams et al., 2014a; Inagaki et al., 2016; Kuss
et al., 2013; Telzer et al., 2013). Our results extend on these
findings by showing that individual differences in empathic
concern can also predict the rewarding feeling of giving to
distant others, such as charities. However, we examined reward
processing after vicarious gains in a very specific setting—that
is, in a paradigm without control over the outcomes and in
which the gains for a charity were not costly for the participants.
Therefore, it should be noted that future research will be needed
to unravel whether our results are generalizable to situations in
which participants have more or full control over the outcome,
or to situations in which participants have to give up resources
to benefit the charity. On the other hand, the significant relations
between donating behavior and empathy and between neural
activation in the ventral striatum and empathy suggest that the
underlying processes, both in vicarious gaining and in real-life
donating behavior, might be similar, although more research
will be necessary to investigate this.
Gaining and the medial prefrontal cortex, anterior
cingulate cortex, and insula
Besides activity in the ventral striatum, we also observed ac-
tivity patterns that were greater for self-gain than for both-
gain. That is, regions in the medial prefrontal cortex (medial
frontal gyrus) extending into the anterior cingulate cortex (cin-
gulum), as well as bilateral insula, were active when gaining
more for the self, relative to gaining for both self and charity.
The medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a heterogeneous region
involved in many functions. For instance, prior studies have
suggested that the medial PFC is important for a range of
cognitive processes, such as memory and decision making
(Euston et al., 2012), integrating social information (Van
Overwalle, 2009), self-orientation, self-reflection (Feng
et al., 2015; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011; Zaki & Mitchell,
2011), and fairness considerations regarding the self (Civai,
Miniussi, & Rumiati, 2014). In the present study, it could be
that medial PFC activation reflected self-relevance, since one
of the prime differences between the self-gain and both-gain
conditions was that the self condition was more self-relevant
(in which the participant gained money and nothing happened
for charity) than the both-condition (in which both parties
gained money). However, the peak activation was more pos-
terior in our study than in these studies. It should also be noted
that medial PFC and bilateral insula were not significantly
more active for self-gain than for charity gain, making it un-
likely that self-oriented processes were the only explanation
for the medial PFC and insula activity.
In addition, we considered fairness considerations as a pos-
sible process that might underlie differences in medial PFC
and insula activation between the self- and both-gain
conditions. Since the stakes were divided equally in the
Bboth^ conditions and unequally in the Bself^ conditions, this
inequality might have triggered fairness considerations.
Furthermore, it is possible that activation in the medial PFC
and the insula together might reflect feelings of shame or guilt
(Bastin, Harrison, Davey, Moll, & Whittle, 2016; Michl et al.,
2014). That is, participants might feel more guilty or ashamed
when they gain money for themselves only than when they
gain money for a charity or for both themselves and a charity.
Neither explanation accounts for the absence of medial PFC
activation when comparing self-gain to charity-gain; there-
fore, future research will be necessary in order to understand
the exact roles of medial PFC and insula when comparing
gains for oneself only versus gains for others.
In addition, the increased activation that we found in me-
dial PFC for self-gain as compared to both-gain extended into
the anterior cingulate sulcus (ACCs). Activation in this region
has previously been associated with—among other
processes—information processing when learning in nonso-
cial contexts (Apps, Rushworth, & Chang, 2016), personal
pain, and empathy for others experiencing pain (Lockwood,
2016). Whereas it is unlikely to be the case that the stronger
activation in self-gain than in both-gain reflects pain for the
participant (since self-gain is objectively better for the partic-
ipant), it might be the case that the activation in the ACCs in
this contrast reflects activation related to learning. That is,
even though participants objectively could not learn in the
present study, since trials were presented in a random se-
quence, they might have attempted to find patterns in order
to maximize self-gain.
Limitations and future directions
When interpreting our results, several limitations need to be
taken into account. Since our paradigm was jittered between
trials but not between the decision phase and the outcome
phase within a trial, we cannot temporally distinguish between
these phases. However, even though we cannot temporally
distinguish, we can still statistically distinguish the decision
and outcome phases. That is, since the decision phase was
identical in each of our conditions, any activation associated
with the decision phase would be washed out across contrast
conditions. Thus, any significant activations found in the con-
trasts had to be the result of a systematic difference between
outcome conditions. Second, an interesting direction for fu-
ture research would be to use prediction error models to in-
vestigate how participants react. For our present paradigm, a
classical prediction-error model would not be the best fit, be-
cause one of our intentions was to develop a task without a
real choice for the participant, to ensure that we would have
enough trials in each payoff condition. Considering the an-
swers to the control question gauging whether participants
thought they were able to influence the outcome, it seems that
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this was effective. Therefore, it seems unlikely that partici-
pants built up expectations related to their choices, making
our paradigm unsuitable for analyzing prediction errors.
Conclusions
To conclude, this study showed that self-gains were consis-
tently related to activity in the ventral striatum, replicating
earlier studies (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015; Braams,
Peters, et al., 2014b; Delgado, 2007; Montague & Berns,
2002; Morelli et al., 2015; Schultz, 2016; Sescousse et al.,
2013). Furthermore, although we found no rewarding effect
(Bwarm glow^) of vicarious gaining for charity on a group
level, we showed that this activity for vicarious charity gains
was related to individual differences in empathy and self-
reported enjoyment for charity gains. These findings support
earlier literature (Braams, Peters, et al., 2014b; Inagaki et al.,
2016; Telzer et al., 2013) suggesting that the strength of the
relationship to the target is important for the Bwarm glow^
effect to be found in vicarious gaining settings. Some studies
have shown that reputation building may indeed increase ac-
tivity in the ventral striatum in conditions of reciprocity,
supporting this idea (Mobbs et al., 2015; Phan, Sripada,
Angstadt, & McCabe, 2010). To further this line of research,
future studies could examine these social context factors on
charity giving in more detail, by investigating the role of rela-
tionships to specific charities in explaining the rewarding feel-
ing of vicarious gaining.
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